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ABSTRACT
Hardware virtualization technologies play a significant role in cyber security. On the one hand,
these technologies enhance security levels, by designing a trusted operating system. On the other
hand, these technologies can be taken up into modern malware which is rather hard to detect.
None of the existing methods is able to efficiently detect a hypervisor in the face of
countermeasures such as time cheating, temporary self-uninstalling, memory hiding, etc. New
hypervisor detection methods which will be described in this paper can detect a hypervisor under
these countermeasures and even count several nested ones. These novel approaches rely on the
new statistical analysis of time discrepancies by examination of a set of instructions, which are
unconditionally intercepted by a hypervisor. Reliability was achieved through the comprehensive
analysis of the collected data despite its fluctuation. These offered methods were comprehensively
assessed in both Intel and AMD CPUs.
Keywords: hypervisor threat, rootkit hypervisor, nested hypervisors, instruction execution time,
statistics and data analysis, Blue Pill.
1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays successful malware detection is
becoming increasingly important, because
malware cyber-attacks can result in financial,
reputational, process and other losses. We can
overcome these risks only through anticipatory
development of advanced cyber security
solutions.
Intel and AMD have released more
advanced CPUs with hardware virtualization
support, which runs code directly on top of the
physical hardware. This privileged code is
named Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM), bare-
metal hypervisor or just “hypervisor”. A
hypervisor with a secure system monitor
functions allows us to run multiple OSes
at the same time in one PC, (see Figure 1). As
a result, this architecture maximizes the
hardware utilization and reduces the costs of
operation. This is an obvious advantage of
hardware virtualization based hypervisors
(Derock, 2009; Barrett, & Kipper, 2010). At
present more than a billion processors with
this technology are installed in workstations as
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well as in cloud computing servers on the
Internet.
However, at the same time hardware
virtualization technology increases
vulnerability of systems, seeing that rootkit
hypervisor with backdoor functionality can be
planted in the PC (Ben-Yehuda, 2013). This
type of rootkits is also known as Hardware-
based Virtual Machine Rootkit (HVM rootkit).
The cyber security community faces the
challenge of hypervisor detection. Presently
there is no built-in tool to detect a hypervisor
reliably. Of course we can check basic things:
CR4.VMXE bit in Intel case (Intel, 2014) or
EFER.SVME bit in AMD case (AMD, 2013),
but a hypervisor can hide its original value.
Moreover, it is impossible to block, stop or
unload a hypervisor by using existing known
cyber security tools, resides on virtualized OS
level.
The difficulties of this challenge arise from
the following causes. First, hypervisors can use
a wide variety of different techniques to
prevent detection. Second, it is possible to run
several nested hypervisors. Third, a hypervisor
can be installed via a driver or boot records as
well as via BIOS (Kovah, Kallenberg,
Butterworth, & Cornwell, 2014) or UEFI
(Bulygin, Loucaides, Furtak, Bazhaniuk, &
Matrosov, 2014), which makes the deleting of a
hypervisor rather difficult.
Utin (2014) analyzed the possibility of
BIOS-based hypervisor threat. The author’s
ideas are based on the suspicious hypervisor
(Russian Ghost) whose detection is simple,
because it does not apply any countermeasures.
Despite the fact that hardware virtualization is
not new and involves a world-wide community
of researchers, the development of effective
hypervisor detection methods has so far been
without success.
Figure 1. PC without Hypervisor and under Control of the Two
Nested Hypervisors: a Legitimate one and Rootkit
Virtual
machine 2
Hardware
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machine 1
Install
hypervisors
Hypervisor with secure
system monitor functions
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The goal of this paper is to tackle this
issue. This article presents new detection
methods which are based on the difference
between the instruction execution time (IET)
both, with a hypervisor and without it. We
applied a set of specific instructions which
cause VM-exits unconditionally or are trapped
by a hypervisor. As a result, IET takes
significantly more time with a hypervisor than
without any hypervisor.
This time, discrepancy is commonly used
to detect hypervisors. However, detection by
time is possible only if a hypervisor is not
hiding itself via timestamp cheating (Fritsch,
2008; Garfinkel, Adams, Warfield, & Franklin,
2007) or via a temporary self-uninstalling
hypervisor–the Blue Chicken technique
(Rutkowska, & Tereshkin, 2007). Under these
conditions the hypervisor detection methods
based on time discrepancies will not work.
Therefore, a totally new hypervisor detection
approach, which is resilient to
countermeasures, is needed.
In a nutshell, the proposed methods
consider the IET as a random variable, whose
properties depend on hypervisor presence. That
is why by applying probabilistic and statistical
methods to IET, it may be possible to detect a
hypervisor.
Our detection methods have improved on
the current time-based detection method,
which uses unconditionally intercepted
instructions. Unlike the original method our
approach is able to detect any stealthy
hypervisor, which has applied countermeasures:
time-cheating, temporary self-uninstalling etc.
This is a distinct advantage of these new
methods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 is devoted to the analysis of
the most popular software and hardware
hypervisor detection approaches. The analysis
will be given in the case of a hypervisor using
countermeasures to prevent its detection, such
as time cheating, temporary self-uninstalling,
preventing memory dump acquisition etc.
Section 3 contains the processor behavior
analysis in the three cases without a
hypervisor, with one and several nested
hypervisors. Analysis has discovered new useful
statistics for the IET, which can reveal
hypervisors.
In Section 4, the experimental results of
statistics examination are presented. The
positive results of these checks make it possible
to analyze IET as a random variable. As a
result, this allows us to use threshold values of
statistics to detect each hypervisor. This
approach works well under the
countermeasures and fluctuations of measured
time durations. The present author’s threshold
generated methods and hypervisor detection
approaches and their analysis are briefly
presented.
Section 5 contains the main conclusions
and further research directions.
2. RELATED WORK
Nowadays, there is no hypervisor detection
build-in tool for Intel. The built-in tool for
AMD CPU is vulnerable to hypervisor
countermeasures. Therefore, researchers are
working hard to solve this challenge. This
paper gives a classification and analysis of all
publicly available hypervisor detection
methods and approaches.
The history of hypervisor detection started
in 2007 after the first hypervisor rootkit
“Blue Pill” was presented by Rutkowska
(2006). “Blue Pill” is a Windows based driver
for AMD CPU. At the same time, Dai Zovi
(2006) released “Vitriol”–a similar hypervisor
for MAC OS and Intel CPU.
The comparative analysis of these two
hypervisors was presented by Fannon (2014).
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“Blue Pill” and “Vitriol” became high-profile
tools in information security sphere and
motivated the creation a lot of different
approaches to hypervisor detection. Their
classification is given in Figure 2. We can
classify these into four categories:
signature-based, behavior-based, detection
based on the trusted hypervisor, and
approaches which use time analysis.
Signature-based detection uses memory
scanning of hypervisors’ patterns. The latter
three sections are based on interaction with a
hypervisor.
2.1 Signature-Based Detection
After a hypervisor has been loaded into
memory its dispatcher (VMM handler) and
Virtual Machine Control Structure (VMCS in
Intel case) will be located in memory. The
hypervisor can be detected by signature
analysis of the physical memory (Bulygin &
Samyde, 2008; Desnos, Filiol, & Lefou, 2011;
Medley, 2007).
This approach consists of two stages:
memory dump and its inspection, both of
which are not resilient to the hypervisor’s
countermeasures. Analysis shows that software
based memory dump approaches are
vulnerable, whereas the hardware ones are only
applicable under laboratory conditions (Korkin
& Nesterov, 2014).
Let us analyze how resistant the current
hypervisor’s signatures are.
Thus, Fritsch (2008) proposed to detect
“Blue Pill” hypervisor by searching “BLPB”,
“BLUE” and “BLUP” strings in a memory
dump. However, in common cases such strings
will be unknown to analysts.
The Actaeon system (Graziano, Lanzi, &
Balzarotti, 2013) is based on searching for
VMCS fragments. However, this method can
sometimes fail. For example, hypervisor can
Figure 2. Hypervisor Detection Methods Classification
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allocate in memory 100 structures to hamper
detection. These VMCSes are similar to
original VMCS. After that, the Actaeon system
may reveal many false VMCSes so separation
between the original one and the rest will
require a considerable amount of manual work.
As a result, signature-based detection is
ineffective for resistant hypervisors.
2.2 Behavior-Based Detection
Behavior-based detection relies on the system
activity differences in the two cases, with and
without a hypervisor. There are three
behavior-based detection methods: TLB-based
detection and methods based on errors in
hypervisors and errors in CPUs.
2.2.1 TLB-Based Detection
It is possible to apply the Translation
Lookaside Buffer (TLB) which is a memory
cache used to speed address translation to
detect a hypervisor (Desnos et al., 2011;
Fritsch, 2008; Morabito, 2012; Wailly, 2014).
TLB includes a set of recently accessed
virtual and corresponding physical addresses.
Every time OS accesses memory a
corresponding TLB entry is searched for. If the
requested virtual address is present in the
TLB, the retrieved physical address will be
used to access memory. In the other case, the
longtime search with the help of Page
Directory will occur. This peculiarity will be
discussed later in Section 2.4.1.
It is known that VM-exit leads to ﬂushing
of TLB when a hypervisor is present.
Otherwise, without a hypervisor such clearance
does not occur. This is why hypervisor
detection reduces to checking TLB content,
which can be made in several ways, for
example, by modifying page table entry (Myers
& Youndt, 2007).
However, TLB-based detection does not
work on AMD CPUs and new Intel CPUs. The
new supplementary TLB fields “ASID” and
“PCID” do not let VM-exit flush TLB.
2.2.2 Detection Based on Bugs in
CPU
A hypervisor can be detected with the help of
bugs in certain CPU models. In these CPUs,
the results of some instructions depend on
whether or not a hypervisor is present.
The “Erratum 140” in AMD CPU is based
on using results of “RDMSR 10h”. The original
value of the Time Stamp Counter (TSC) is
returned by “RDMSR 10h” while “RDTSC”
gets the sum of TSC value and
VMCS.TSC_OFFSET value (AMD, 2011).
Another bug “VMSAVE 0x67” freezes the
system. The execution of the VMSAVE
instruction with 0x67 prefix stops
virtualization system. Without a hypervisor,
this error does not occur (Barbosa, 2007).
These detection methods are applicable
only for outdated CPUs and require non trivial
adaptation to new CPUs.
2.2.3 Detection Based on Bugs in
Hypervisors
There are software hypervisor bugs similar to
hardware bugs in CPU.
Microsoft published their paper “Hypervisor
Top-Level Functional Specification”, which
describes how to detect a hypervisor and get
“Hypervisor Vendor ID Signature”, by using
CPUID (O'Neill, 2010; Microsoft, 2013).
Spoofing attack is likely to occur, when a
hypervisor can replace data, trapped by
CPUID execution.
“Blue Pill” hypervisor has a built-in control
interface, which uses “Bpknock” hypercalls
(BluePillStudy, 2010; Fritsch, 2008). Calling
CPUID with EAX=0xbabecafe changes EAX
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to 0x69696969, if “Blue Pill” is present.
Otherwise, such a change does not occur. Due
to the hypervisor’s built-in control interface, it
is possible not only to detect, but also unload a
hypervisor (Gabris, 2009).
A hypervisor can also be detected by
reading debugging messages. For example, a
developer or hacker might have forgotten to
remove DbgPrint calls, which can disclose a
hypervisor’s activity.
These approaches can reveal only
well-known hypervisors, which do not take
countermeasures.
2.3 Detection Based on the Trusted
Hypervisor
A hypervisor which is loaded first can control
and block activity of hypervisors which are
loaded later. This detection method was used
in “McAfee DeepSAFE” (McAfee, 2012),
“Hypersight Rootkit Detector” (North Security
Labs, 2011), “Symantec Endpoint Protection”
(Korkin, 2012), and it has also been mentioned
in papers (Park, 2013; Wang & Jiang, 2010).
This detection approach is vulnerable to
“Man-In-The-Middle” (MITM) attack, in which
an illegitimate hypervisor can gain control first
and compromise a legitimate one, which was
loaded later on. TPM-based attestation of
hypervisor can avoid this attack, although
TMP mechanism is vulnerable too (Berger et
al., 2006; Brossard & Demetrescu, 2012;
Wojtczuk, & Rutkowska, 2009; Wojtczuk,
Rutkowska, & Tereshkin, 2009).
MITM attack can be also prevented by
loading hypervisor from BIOS, as well as by
applying Trusted Startup Hardware Module
(Accord, 2010). However, due to the difficulty
of porting this detection method, it is
applicable only to labs.
2.4 Time-Based Detection
Time-based detection uses the measuring of
time duration of specific operations or profiling
of its execution time. When a hypervisor is
present, the execution of such operations is
intercepted by the hypervisor. As a result,
their duration will be longer than without a
hypervisor.
Four time-based methods can be
mentioned:
TLB- and RSB-based detection, detection
based on memory access, and detection by
unconditionally intercepted instructions. Let us
focus on these methods applicable in the
situation where a hypervisor prevents its
detection by time cheating and temporary
self-uninstalling.
2.4.1 TLB-Based Detection
As it was mentioned before in Section 2.2.1,
the TLB flushes every time VM-exit occurs.
After that, the longtime fill will happen. It is
possible to use this fact to detect hypervisor as
follows (Ramos, 2009; Rutkowska, 2007):
1. Read the content of a specific memory
address.
2. Repeat step 1 and measure its
duration. In this case the TLB entry,
which was added on step 1, will be
used.
3. Execute unconditionally intercepted
instruction (forcing a VM-exit).
4. Repeatedly carry out step 2.
5. Make a conclusion about the hypervisor
presence by comparing the results of
steps 2 and 4.
This approach does not work if the
hypervisor uses time cheating, because there is
no significant difference between these two
steps. This approach has the same
disadvantages as in Section 2.2.1.
2.4.2 RSB-Based Detection
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Another detection method is based on Return
Stack Buffer (RSB), which increases computer
performance. RSB content as well as TLB
suffers changes when VM-exit occurs, but
unlike TLB, RSB includes addresses of RET
instructions.
Applying RSB to hypervisor detection was
described by Bulygin (2008), and later by
Fritsch (2008) and Athreya (2010). After 16
nested functions calls, RSB will consist of 16
corresponding return addresses. The idea of the
detection lies in an attempt to fill the RSB
buffer, call VM-exit, for example by calling an
unconditionally intercepted instruction,
measure an execution time of these 16
functions. If a hypervisor is present, it
intercepts VM-exit and replaces a part of RSB
entries. As a result, the whole duration will be
longer than without a hypervisor.
This method is vulnerable to the
hypervisor’s countermeasures, for example if a
hypervisor dispatcher has no sub-functions it is
also vulnerable to time cheating attack
(Athreya, 2010).
2.4.3 Detection Based on Memory
Access
A hypervisor can prevent its signature
detection by controlling memory access
(Section 2.1), which increases the duration of
memory access and can be applied to
hypervisor detection (Fisher-Ogden, 2006;
Fritsch, 2008).
By walking successively through memory
we measure each time the duration of memory
page access. The memory region with excessive
access duration is the stealth memory region.
This region can consist of hypervisor
dispatcher and corresponding structures.
However, this method works only if the
hypervisor does not use time cheating for self-
protection.
2.4.4 Detection by
Unconditionally Intercepted
Instructions
It is known that the duration of execution of
unconditionally intercepted instructions
increases after any hypervisor has been loaded
in the system. We can detect hypervisor
presence by comparing time duration with
some threshold values (Athreya, 2010;
Lakshminarayanan, Patel, Robinson, &
Soulami, 2012).
Hardware virtualization for Intel CPU
includes a set of unconditionally intercepted
instructions, e. g., CPUID (Intel, 2014), for
AMD CPU case we can use RDMSR
(Morabito, 2012), which has to be triggered by
a hypervisor. The authors also suggest
measuring a HDD access time, RAM access
time or duration of cryptographic computation
(Kyte, Zavarsky, Lindskog, & Ruhl, 2012; Pek,
& Buttyan, 2014). But such events can only be
revealed by specialized hypervisors and does
not work in ordinary cases.
This detection approach is vulnerable to
“Blue Chicken” technique and time cheating
(Rutkowska, & Tereshkin, 2008). Nevertheless,
this approach appears to be the most
attractive because of its usability and
portability. This approach is also universal, as
a hypervisor will always spend time on
VM-exits (VM-entries), and this time needs to
be hidden. Because of these advantages this
approach was chosen and was significantly
improved.
2.5 Analysis of Counters to Measure
Instruction Execution Time
Instruction execution time (IET) or its
duration is the main scope of this research, so
let us classify and analyze the capabilities of
the computer counters, which can be applied
to measure, e.g., the execution time of ten
CPUID instructions.
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Counters can be classified as software and
hardware ones. Hardware counters use device
capabilities and may be further classified as
local and remote ones.
The software counter (or SMP counter) is
based on simultaneous work of two loops
(Desnos et al., 2011; Jian, Huaimin, Shize, &
Bo, 2010; Morabito, 2012), which are running
on different CPU cores. The first thread
increments the control variable, while the
second one executes the unconditionally
intercepted instruction in the loop, for example
1000 times. The conclusion about hypervisor
presence is made by comparing the results of a
control variable with the threshold value. One
paper (Li, Zhu, Zhou, & Wang, 2011) describes
how to prevent this approach by applying
memory modification, which contains the
control variable.
To measure IET we can use the following
hardware counters TSC, RTC, ACPI Timer,
APIC Timer, HPET, PIT, local device
counters, e.g., GPU timer, and NTP-based
clock. Our analysis shows that all these
counters apart from TSC and SMP have
low-resolution and cannot be used in ordinary
cases. SMP counting requires no less than two
CPU cores and can be cheated. The best
choice to measure the IET is TSC because of
its accuracy and high-resolution. TSC also
works on all CPUs. To eliminate the influence
of other running programs on IET, we can use
TSC on the highest IRQL and set the affinity
of the measuring code with one of the CPU
cores.
The important advantage of TSC is the
possibility to cheat on it easily, so we can
simulate a stealthy hypervisor and test our
detection approach in a real case.
2.6 Conclusion
The above analysis shows that the existing
approaches and hypervisor detection tools have
the following drawbacks:
1. Signature-based approaches are
vulnerable to hypervisor
countermeasures. Only Actaeon project
can detect nested hypervisors, but it
can also be compromised.
2. Behavior-based detection methods do
not reveal new hypervisors and do not
work on new CPUs.
3. Trusted hypervisor-based approach is
susceptible to MITM attack.
4. Time-based detection approaches are
vulnerable to time cheating and Blue
Chicken technique.
Detection by unconditionally intercepted
instructions is highly attractive because it
relies on a generally applicable technique. By
improving data acquisition and processing, we
can overcome the drawbacks of this method.
3. THEORETICAL
PRINCIPLES FOR
ENHANCEMENT OF
TIME-BASED
DETECTION
Detection by unconditionally intercepted
instructions works well only if a hypervisor
does not apply countermeasures: time cheating
and temporary self-uninstalling. In this section
the enhancement of this method is described.
Our prerequisites are based on specific
features of IET. One of them is the relation
between the average IET and presence of a
hypervisor. Another well-known one is a
random nature of IET, but it is still unclear
how to use it in practice.
To grapple with this gap, let us look at the
switching schemes between different CPU
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operating modes, which occur after OS is
loaded.
We demonstrate and analyze what actually
happens when a set of CPUID instructions are
being executed in three cases: when the
hypervisor is present, not present and when
several nested ones are present.
Further, we will focus on two IET
characteristics: variance of IET array and IET
array layering.
According to some papers (Duflot,
Etiemble, & Grumelard, 2006; Embleton,
Sparks, & Zou, 2008; Zmudzinski, 2009)
without a hypervisor a CPU can operate in one
of the two modes: either in the Protected Mode
(P-mode) or System Management Mode
(S-mode), which is depicted in Figure 3, a.
System Management Interrupt (SMI) switches
from the P- to S-mode, CPU leaves S-mode
and returns to the previous mode by using
RSM instruction.
We can conclude that CPU is a stochastic
system with random transitions between
states, because of a random nature of SMI.
Therefore, IET is a random value determined
by the number of SMI.
After the hypervisor is loaded, the CPU
can switch between the three modes. As in the
previous case, the P- and S- modes are present
but an additional VMX root mode (V-mode) is
added, so the P-mode is named as
VMX non root mode (Intel, 2014). The
P-mode is accepted as the main one, S-mode is
duplicated for better clarity, see Figure 3, b.
Execution of each CPUID instruction in P-
mode always leads to switching to the V-mode
(VM-exit), and after execution it switches back
to the P-mode. Switching to the S-mode might
occur either from P-mode or from V-mode.
Similar to the previous case, we may
assume that CPU works as a stochastic
system, but switching to the V-mode enhances
its random nature. As a result, switching
increases the average value of IET as well as
the variability of IET.
a b
Figure 2. Switching between Modes in Two Cases: (a) without a Hypervisor, and (b) with One
Hypervisor
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CPU works in a similar way in cases when
several hypervisors are present (Ben-Yehuda et
al., 2010). CPU can also switch between three
modes, but the situation will be different
because of several hypervisors dispatchers, see
Figure 4.
In this case, execution of each CPUID
instructions in P-mode always leads to
switching to the V-mode, and further, each
hypervisor’s dispatcher is successively called
beginning from dispatcher #1 to dispatcher #2
etc. to dispatcher #e and backwards. Finally,
execution will switch to P-mode. S-mode can
gain control at any point. Now, CPU also
works as a stochastic system, but participation
of several nested dispatchers significantly
lengthens the time of execution and increases
IET variability. These schemes allow us to
discover that the root of randomness of IET is
actually the randomness of SMI.
Suppose that probability or frequency of
SMI is a constant. After a hypervisor is loaded,
due to the increased IET the number of SMI is
increased as well. That is why the variance of
IET will increase after a hypervisor is loaded
and this fact can be used for detection. During
the execution of a set of CPUID, the number
of SMI is limited. If we repeat measuring of
IET in a loop, we can see that some of its
values are repeated. Hence, array of IET
values can be grouped by sets with the same
values (for details see Chapter 4). As a result,
we can see that the array of IET values has a
layered nature in all described cases. The
number of layers will increase after a
hypervisor is loaded and this fact can also be
used for hypervisor detection.
The revealed IET variability indexes,
variance (or second moment) and number of
layers (or spectral width) are resilient to time
cheating. Hypervisor can only decrease the
mean value of IET but not the variability
characteristics.
As a first approximation, this analysis
reveals two theoretical hypervisor indicators.
This result is based on a hypothesis but now it
has to be comprehensively verified by
experiments.
Figure 3. Switching between Modes with Several Nested Hypervisors
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4. INSTRUCTION
EXECUTION TIME
RESEARCH & NEW
STEALTH
HYPERVISORS
DETECTION
ALGORITHMS
Probabilistic hypervisor detection is discussed
in following papers (Desnos et al., 2011;
Fritsch, 2008; Jian et al., 2010; Morabito,
2012). All these methods work only if a
hypervisor is not hiding itself. What is more,
these papers do not give enough attention to
the random nature of IET.
Detection of stealthy hypervisors faces two
challenges: time cheating and data
fluctuations, which will be described in this
paper.
4.1 Probabilistic Nature of
Instruction Execution Time
Desnos, Filiol, and Lefou (2011) suggested that
the instruction execution time is normally
distributed and there are no problems with
precision (repeatability and reproducibility) of
the measurement data.
However, all our experiments on different
PCs showed that the measurement data are
non-normally distributed. There are no well-
known distribution patterns which these data
would match. Moreover, data fluctuation is so
large that mean and variance statistics differ
significantly between sets of experiments.
Therefore, the precision of the measurement
data does not comply with ISO 5725 (2004)
requirements.
We have to take into consideration that
outliers and jumps (discontinuity) are very
common, which will alter statistical values, see
Figure 5. A possible reason for outliers and
jumps is the pipeline of instructions. Due to
the fact that the time measurement procedure
is quite simple and a PoC hypervisor with time
cheating can be used, we can receive an
abundance of experimental data for research
and detection phase, which significantly helps.
Relying on the probabilistic nature of IET we
dealt with when setting up experiments, these
revealed data peculiarities, processing of
preliminary data, only appeared after that we
applied statistical methods.
4.2 Experiments on Measurements of
Instruction Execution Time
To detect a hypervisor, we improve the
detection method, which uses unconditionally
intercepted instructions. We analyze IET sets
in the two cases with a hypervisor and without
any.
Experimental data was received by
measuring a set of ten CPUID instructions by
using RDTSC in a loop in Windows driver, see
Figure 6. To dismiss the influence of other
apps and drivers in the OS we ensured thread
affinity with certain CPU core and raise IRQL
to its maximum level. It is also possible to use
deferred procedure call (DPC) to achieve an
exclusive access to the hardware. An example
of this scheme is described by Blunden (2012).
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We use CPUID instruction as an
unconditionally intercepted one by any
Intel-based hypervisor and also as a serializing
instruction which prevents out-of-order
execution (Intel, 1998; Fog, 2014).
Our proof-of-concept hypervisor (PoC
hypervisor) is based on the VMM framework
by Embleton (2007) with an added TSC
cheating function. There are three different
ways to cheat TSC: by TSC_OFFSET field in
VMCS, catching execution of RDTSC or
CPUID. We chose the last one: our hypervisor
decreases the TSC's value every time CPUID
is executed. This hypervisor's dispatcher is the
smallest. By cheating TSC, we can make sure
that the average values of IET are the same to
within one clock tick, whether the hypervisor is
present or not. Therefore, this is the most
complex case for detection.
To obtain data, we used two nested loops.
An example of an inner loop is shown in Figure
6; it was executed 1000 times without any
delays. Outer loop was executed 10 times with
a two-second delay between each iteration.
The results of this experiment were recorded to
a 1000x10 array (see Table 1); the columns
contain data from inner loops.
According to ISO 5725 repeatability
requirements, we repeated the complete
experiment five times with a two-second delay
between each iteration. To control
reproducibility of data we checked the results
on 10 different days. All in all for this period,
we measured 50 arrays of 1000x10, which will
be further processed. That period was
sufficient to reduce variation intervals of
statistics: average values, variance etc.
Six PCs were involved in testing, see Table
2. In the first five PCs, we used our PoC
hypervisor, and in the last PC, we used a
specialized hypervisor loaded by BIOS–TRace
EXplorer (TREX) by Tichonov and Avetisyan
(2011).
Figure 4. Scatter Plot of IET Array Fragment with One Outlier and
Jump
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Table 1
Example of Array of Measured IET without a Hypervisor
Measurement
no
Inner loop iteration
1 2 … 10
1 2896 2888 … 2896
2 2896 2888 … 2880
… … … … …
1000 2888 2888 … 2888
Average of a
column 2895 2888 … 2888
Variance of a
column 1738 1267 … 1196
Table 2
CPU Models and OS Versions
PC# CPU models and OS versions
1 Intel Core 2 Duo E6300 / Windows 7
2 Intel Core 2 Duo E8200 / Windows 7
3 Intel Core 2 Duo E8600 / Windows Live CD XP
4 Intel Core i7 950 / Windows XP
5 Intel Xeon X5600 / Windows 7
6 AMD Phenom X4 945 / Windows Live CD XP
Figure 5. Code Fragment for Obtaining Data
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4.3 Peculiarities of Instruction
Execution Time and Ways of
Hypervisors Detection
Our experiments confirmed the following:
1. IET measured by TSC is a random
value, which depends on a CPU model,
OS version and on whether or not a
hypervisor is present.
2. The average and variance of IET arrays
are larger if a hypervisor is present
than if it is not.
3. The difference between average and
variance of IET arrays becomes more
significant after every new nested
hypervisor has been loaded.
We can easily and reliably detect a non-
hidden hypervisor by just comparing the
average values of IET arrays. The average
values of IET arrays with a non-hidden
hypervisor are almost 10 times larger than
without it.
But a hypervisor can apply time cheating
technique, and as a result, the average values
of IET will be the same as corresponding
values without a hypervisor. There are no
time-based detection methods which work well
under such circumstances. Our experiments
were focused on this challenging case.
Using more common statistical methods in
hypervisor detection proved to be inapplicable.
The reasons will be given below.
By using statistics, we can determine if
there is a statistically significant difference
between two sets of data. We already know
which of the set will be measured with
exposure and without it.
But in the current situation we have
several sets. We can connect several sets to a
big one, and use classical approaches, but such
operation has to be proved. For this case, there
are no proven statistical methods.
Applying current approaches to determine
significant difference between the sets did not
yield any positive results for a variety of
reasons. We can consider the columns of arrays
as a random sample, also as a result of the
random process. It is impossible to use the first
method because of the fluctuation of
measurements and lack of homogeneity. The
second method is not applicable either, because
of overlapping variation intervals and
instability of characteristics.
We see that homogeneity of variances
(HOV) is violated in all our experimental data,
and as a result we cannot use analysis of
variance (ANOVA) in data processing.
We conclude that methods of parametric
and non-parametric statistics are not
applicable in the current situation. That is
why we developed the following methods,
including the present author’s approaches:
1. Low-frequency filtration.
2. Calculation of experimental probability.
3. Two-step way to calculate statistics.
4. Variation interval as confidence
interval.
5. Iteration of measurements if the
statistical value is at the intersection of
two variation intervals.
Due to filtration, we can decrease
fluctuation and stabilize variation
characteristics.
Due to calculation of experimental
probability, we can find threshold values and
so minimize type I and II errors.
We choose a two-step way of calculating in
order to reduce overlapping of these
characteristic intervals.
To calculate a confidence interval, we
choose the idea of the confidence interval
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method of Strelen (2004) and Kornfeld (1965),
in which a confidence interval is calculated as
a variation interval or difference between
maximum ( ) and minimum ( ) values
of statistic. The confidence level is the
following { ≪ < } = 1 − 0.5 ,
where ‘ ’ is the length of a sample.
We have to study a situation when a
calculated statistical value will be at the
intersection of two variation intervals. In this
situation it is impossible to decide whether a
hypervisor is present or not. In this case we
have to repeat measurements of IET arrays
and calculations of statistics. In accordance
with the multiplication theorem of probability
a recurrent hit in the intersection zone is
unlikely.
4.3.1 Applying Layered Structure
of IET Arrays to Hypervisors
Detection
Numerous experiments show that IET arrays
have a layered structure. It means that each
IET array is comprised of several layers, whose
characteristics depend on CPU, OS and
whether or not a hypervisor is present.
First of all, our experiments confirm that
the number of layers with a hypervisor is
larger than without a hypervisor.
To make it clear, the results of an
experiment are given below. We measured IET
arrays in two cases: without hypervisor and
with it.
The right part of Figure 7 is a scatter plot
of the IET array; each point corresponding to
the measured duration of ten CPUID
instructions. Experiment numbers are on the
x-axis, while IET values are displayed on the
y-axis.
Blue color corresponds to IET without a
hypervisor, red color corresponds to IET with
a hypervisor, which is applying time cheating.
This technique leads to getting approximately
the same mean value if hypervisor is present
with the mean value without a hypervisor.
The left part of Figure 7 shows the
corresponding frequency polygons or relative
frequency chart. We can see that with a
hypervisor the number of polygon points (or
number of layers) is larger than without a
hypervisor.
The similar nature of polygons was also
noted by Morabito (2012). His observations
show that the data is generally not normally
distributed and skewed, long-tailed data with
outliers is fairly common. Similar plots of IET
array fragments are given in the paper by
Fritsch (2008) in the part “A.4 Empirical
results” and by Li, Zhu, Zhou, & Wang (2011).
However, the fact that layered structure could
be used for hypervisor detection had not been
mentioned.
If several hypervisors are present, the
layering structure of IET arrays is still
obvious. We measured IET arrays in four
different cases: without hypervisor (black),
with only own PoC hypervisor (green), with
only Acronis hypervisor (blue) and with two
nested hypervisors (red). The scatter plots of
the corresponding IET arrays are shown on
Figure 8.
To make it clear, the scatter plots are
spaced vertically. We can see that without a
hypervisor the plot consists of only one line
with quite rare jumps. If PoC hypervisor is
present, the corresponding plot has 2-3 layers
with significant jumps. The situation is similar
if only Acronis hypervisor is present. If two
nested hypervisors are present we can see that
the plot becomes a cloud of points, there are a
lot of layers with low frequency.
The best way to reveal the number of
layers is to use the frequency distribution of
measured IET arrays. We calculate frequency
distribution with each class for one value or
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without intervals of numbers. Number of layers
equals the number of classes.
It is possible to detect a stealth hypervisor,
which uses the Blue Chicken technique.
Temporary self-uninstalling of this hypervisor
originally occurs after 50-100 measurements of
IET because hypervisor needs to recognize
time-based detection. As a result, we will see
the changed nature of the scatter plot: the first
50-100 measurements will have a layered
nature and the remaining portion of
measurements will have just 1-2 layers because
the hypervisor has already been uninstalled.
This changing of the scatter plot will be
repeated in the next columns; because they
were measured with a two-second delay.
However, our experiments show that direct
use of these indicators is problematic for two
reasons. These characteristics are not always
constant (they are unstable) and also variation
ranges of these characteristics overlap each
other whether hypervisor is present or not.
Later we will discuss how to deal with it.
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Figure 6. Scatter Plots of IET Arrays Fragments and Corresponding Frequency Polygons
Figure 7. Scatter Plots of IET Arrays Fragments in Four Different Cases
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4.3.2 Applying Second and Fourth
Moments to Hypervisors
Detection
All our experiments also confirmed the
following result of section 3. After hypervisor is
loaded the numerical values that measure the
spread of IET arrays will increase. We
obtained good results with the second and
fourth moments. Moreover, after loading each
nested hypervisor these sample characteristics
increase, which is clearly seen in Figure 8.
Experiments show that the sixth and higher
moments of IET arrays are seriously
inaccurate.
As mentioned before, outliers and jumps
(discontinuity) significantly affected values of
the second and fourth moments. That is why it
is impossible to achieve a stable distinction
between sample characteristics and draw a
conclusion as to whether a hypervisor is
present or not. Negative impacts of these
factors can be eliminated by simultaneously
applying two techniques: fitting or
low-frequency filtering and “length-averaging”.
We get sample characteristics before and after
an outlier and calculate the final value by
averaging of the corresponding fragments
lengths for “length-averaging”.
In order to reduce overlapping of these
characteristics intervals we chose a two-step
way of calculating. We calculate the second
and fourth moments for each column in the
table (IET array), see Table 1. This brings us
to a set of these characteristics, which we
consider as a new sample and repeatedly
calculate characteristics of this set.
In other words, from the primary column
of IET array we get the secondary
characteristics, which we are processes by
statistical methods. Consequently, this helps us
to significantly reduce or avoid the overlapping
of new characteristics intervals.
All theoretical principles from Section 3
were successfully confirmed by experiment.
The number of layers of IET arrays, second
and fourth moments increased and remained
on the same increased level after a new
hypervisor was loaded, i.e. they can be used to
detect a hypervisor and several nested ones.
Moreover, the ways of calculating threshold
values of each statistic will be given with due
consideration of data fluctuations.
4.4 How to Calculate Threshold
Values of Statistics to Detect
Hypervisors
Hypervisor detection includes comparison of
calculated statistics values with threshold
values. If statistical values are greater than
threshold values, we conclude that a
hypervisor is present, otherwise there is no
hypervisor. The main goal is to find a suitable
filtration level and the statistic, which has an
appropriate threshold value or minimal sum of
type I and type II errors.
To calculate threshold values we have to
measure 50 arrays 1000x10 for two cases when
a hypervisor is present or not, 100 arrays in
total. We use own PoC hypervisor, because it
contains the minimal set of instructions in
CPUID dispatcher and its only role is TSC
cheating. This is the most difficult case. PoC
hypervisor’s threshold values will help to
detect any other hypervisor with more
functions, as it will cause more changes to IET
variation.
Calculating threshold values includes
calculating statistics in two ways after low
frequency filtering with the following levels {0,
0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2} or {0%, 2%, 5%, 10%,
15%, 20%}.
One way is to calculate statistics for each
column 1000x1 of a 1000x10 array. After this
calculation, we analyzed the received set of 10
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values as a new sample and then averaged
them ( ̅ – “averaged columns value”).
Another way is to calculate statistics for
one big column 10,000x1 obtained from an
array 1000x10 by vectorizing (Vectorization
(mathematics), 2014) ( – “vectorized array
value”).
It should not be forgotten that outliers and
jumps (discontinuity) significantly change
statistics values and therefore we have to
delete them. We find a jump as the maximum
value in the first order difference (The Scipy
Community, 2009). The threshold value of a
jump is 300 CPU ticks, which can then be
corrected.
The calculation algorithm of threshold
values is the same for all statistics and includes
three steps:
1. Receive and process IET array every
day. Receive preliminary results.
2. Process the preliminary results which
are obtained for 10 days. Receive
threshold values and probabilities of
type I and II error.
3. Create the final table with all
appropriate statistics.
We are going to describe a way to calculate
threshold values of a new statistic – a number
of layers.
The first step is to filter each column from
Table 1 with different filtration levels. For
each received column we calculate the number
of layers. Calculated values are given in
corresponding columns in Table 3.
The last but one column in Table 3
includes the mean values of the number of
layers for each filtration level. For example,
the first value 12 is (28+29+...+10)/10. The
last column includes the values of the number
of layers, which were calculated from the
column 10,000x1 for each filtration level. For
example, the first value 53 means the number
of layers in the array 10,000x1 after its
filtration with level 0%.
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Table 3
Example of Calculating the Number of Layers If no Hypervisor is Present
Filtering
level
Values of the number of layers
for each column in array
1000x10
Averaged
columns value,̅ Vectorizedarray value,1 2 … 10
0 28 29 … 10 12 53
0.02 4 3 … 3 4 6
0.05 3 3 … 3 3 6
0.1 2 2 … 3 3 3
0.15 1 2 … 2 2 3
0.2 1 2 … 2 2 2
Table 4
Number of Layers of IET Arrays for 2 Cases when a Hypervisor is Present and not
Code of
experiments
No hypervisor Hypervisor is present
Averaged
columns value, ̅ Vectorizedarray value, Averagedcolumns value, ̅ Vectorizedarray value,
day #1 (Ig10)
5 23 11 47
4 18 11 52
4 15 10 34
5 21 13 53
4 15 14 68
... … … …
day #10 (Ig19)
4 20 19 102
6 32 15 77
6 32 16 79
6 32 20 88
10 50 21 105
Variation intervals [4, 14] [10, 110] [8, 21] [29,105]
Threshold values ≤ 7 ≤ 32 ≥ 8 ≥ 33
Type I error 0.04 0.12 – –
Type II error 0 0.16 – –
We can see that with filtration level “0.1”,
the values of ̅ and are stabilized; therefore,
we will use this filtration level for this PC in
the future. The similar table is also created if
PoC hypervisor is present. Four numbers,
values ̅ and in two cases when a hypervisor
is present or not present, are evaluated from a
single 1000x10 array in each case.
This procedure was repeated for each of
five arrays 1000x10 every day, for 10 days.
After that, we create a preliminary table
with threshold values and type I and II errors,
see Table 4.
Stabilization of statistics is obvious in both
cases when a hypervisor is present and not. We
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managed to achieve this stabilization only due
to filtration of jumps and length-averaging, as
previously mentioned.
Variation intervals were determined
according to minimum and maximum values of
the statistics in the columns. Variation
intervals overlap, therefore if statistical values
get into this overlapping, it is impossible to
reliably detect a hypervisor. In these cases, we
have to repeat IET array measurements.
We chose threshold values so that the sum
of probability of type I and II errors was
minimal. Type I error means that we conclude
that the hypervisor is there according to
calculations, while actually it is not there. The
probability of a type I error is experimentally
calculated as a number of values, which are
greater than the threshold value. A
type II error means that we conclude that the
hypervisor is not there, while actually it is
there. The probability of this error is also
experimentally calculated as a number of
values, which is smaller than the threshold
value. In other words, we calculate the
probability of type I and II errors with this
formula , where ‘ ’ is the number of values
in the column, which are outside the threshold,= 50 is the total number of values in the
column. For detection we used only those
statistics, whose sum of type I and II errors are
less than 0.2 (or 20%).
Below is a fragment of the final table
(Table 5) with all appropriate statistics for all
tested PCs from Table 2.
is the average value of IET from all
arrays without a hypervisor and all other
statistical notations are below in Table 6. As
mentioned above, we can calculate the
statistics in two ways: for each column and
after vectorization.
Our research findings suggest that
threshold values depend on Windows version.
For the same hardware threshold values for
Windows XP and Windows 7 are different,
variation intervals of statistics on Windows XP
are smaller than on Windows 7. This occurs
because Windows 7 enables more SMI handlers
than Windows XP.
We performed similar experimental checks
for nested hypervisors. We used the following
iteration algorithm:
1. First, we obtained threshold values for
the case without a hypervisor. To do
this we measured IET arrays without a
hypervisor and with our PoC
hypervisor. We received that ≤ 31
(number of layers) means there is no
hypervisor. The probability of a false
positive is 0.14. ≥ 32 means a
hypervisor is present. The probability
of false negative is 0.06.
2. Second, we installed Acronis Disk
Director, which loaded its own
hypervisor. In the same way we
obtained threshold values for this case.
To do this we measured IET arrays
with only the Acronis hypervisor and
with two nested hypervisors: PoC and
Acronis. We found out that ≤ 67 or
more precisely 32 ≤ ≤ 67 means that
only the Acronis hypervisor is present.≥ 86 means that two nested
hypervisors simultaneously work.
Probability of type I and II errors in
the latter case is 0.
Table 7 includes the threshold values for
all mentioned cases.
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Table 5
Final Table with all Appropriate Statistics
PC Statistics Filtrationlevel
Threshold values Probability
No
hypervisor
Hypervisor is
present
Type I
error
Type II
error
1
0 ≤ 2,911 – – –
0 ≤ 7 ≥ 8 0.04 0
0 ≤ 14 ≥ 18 0.02 0
0.1 ≤ 679 ≥ 947 0.02 0
0.1 ≤ 104,161 ≥ 111,041 0.02 0.10
2
0 ≤ 2492 – – –
0 ≤ 11 ≥ 12 0.1 0.06
0.2 ≤ 100 ≥ 101 0.08 0.1
0.2 ≤ 168 ≥ 13,030 0.14 0.02
3
0 ≤ 2,431 – – –
0 ≤ 6 ≥ 8 0 0
0.1 ≤ 15 ≥ 41 0 0
0.1 ≤ 609 ≥ 3,410 0 0
4
0 ≤ 5,018 – – –
0 ≤ 22 ≥ 26 0.02 0.02
0.1 ≤ 177 ≥ 181 0.1 0.1
5
0 ≤ 2,852 – – –
0 ≤ 67 ≥ 71 0.04 0
0 ≤ 16,416 ≥ 48,920 0 0
6
0 ≤ 2,126 – – –
0 ≤ 34 ≥ 241 0 0̅ 0 ≤ 134 ≥ 593 0 0
0 ≤ 216 ≥ 5,478 0 0
0 ≤ 345 ≥ 5,422 0 0
0.02 ≤ 54 ≥ 956 0 0
Table 6
Statistical Notations
Averaged columns value Vectorized array value
Number of layers
2nd central moment
4th central moment
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Table 7
Threshold Values for Two Nested Hypervisors
Threshold
values
Conclusion about hypervisors and
their numbers Type I error Type II error≤ 31 No hypervisor 0.14 032 ≤ ≤ 67 Only Acronis hypervisor is present 0 0.06≥ 86 Two nested hypervisors are present 0 0
4.5 Detection of Stealthy Hypervisors
According to experiments, the detection of
hypervisors goes in two stages: through
preliminary and operational stages (see Table
8). First of all, we have to make sure that
there is no hypervisor in BIOS. To achieve
this, we update/flash BIOS with a known and
trusted image. Malware in BIOS can prevent
its updating by software utility. That is why
the best way to overwrite BIOS is to desolder
a microchip from the motherboard, flash it by
hardware programmer and solder it back
(Muchychka, 2013).
In the second step, we install OS. We have
to use official images to be certain that OS
images do not include any malware or
illegitimate hypervisors. In addition, OS
components may be checked, for example, by
reverse-engineering.
In the third step, we get threshold values
by using PoC hypervisor. This step was
described above.
In the fourth step, we run the hypervisor
presence check in an infinite loop. We measure
IET arrays in a loop and compare calculated
statistics with threshold values, which were
calculated in step 3. We successively check if a
hypervisor is present on each CPU physical
core.
For the fifth and sixth steps, we install
supplementary software and monitor messages
about new hypervisors.
If we get a message about new hypervisors
after a program installation, we check if this
hypervisor is legitimate. The approaches of
how to do this are beyond the scope of this
paper. It may be noted that we can do it by
calling corresponding support service etc. Once
we conclude that the hypervisor is legitimate,
we have to adapt the detection tool by
obtaining new threshold values (step 3). If we
conclude that the hypervisor is illegitimate, it
must be removed from the system. In some
cases, this is solved by just uninstalling the
previously installed program. However, in more
complicated cases we have to check all the
system components including the BIOS image.
All source codes of getting threshold
values, PoC hypervisor and detection tool are
here (Korkin, 2014). The tool for getting
threshold values consists of two parts:
subsystem for IET arrays acquisition (C++)
and subsystem for threshold values calculation
(MATLAB). PoC hypervisor was developed
using С++ and ASM, and it is compiled with
Visual Studio. The detection tool consists of
two parts: subsystem for IET arrays
acquisition and subsystem for threshold values
checks by MATLAB.
5. CONCLUSIONS,
DISCUSSIONS AND
FUTURE WORK
1. Hypervisor detection is a well-known
challenge. Malware with hypervisor
facilities are serious information security
threats. Many authors and companies are
trying to tackle this challenge.
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2. In this paper, we focused on and improved
time based detection by unconditionally
intercepted instructions. We studied the
case when a hypervisor uses time cheating
and temporary self-uninstalling to prevent
its detection. For this situation,
appropriate time based approaches are not
available on the Internet. Only the
described methods are able to detect
stealthy hypervisors in all known
countermeasures: time-cheating etc.
3. We explored the probability characteristics
of instruction execution time and proposed
a new technique for the detection of a
hypervisor and several nested ones.
4. We developed techniques for calculating
threshold values of various statistics and a
step-by-step guide on how to detect a
hypervisor.
5. These methods work well on different PCs
with both Intel and AMD CPUs and
detected PoC hypervisor and special BIOS
hypervisor.
Table 8
Detection of Stealthy Hypervisors
Stages Stage description
Preliminary
1. Flash BIOS with a trusted image or firmware.
2. Install OS.
3. Get threshold values for no hypervisor case.
Operational
(detection)
4. Check in a loop if a hypervisor is present.
5. Install supplementary software (optional).
6. Monitor messages about a hypervisor presence.
7. To adapt the tool to new legitimate hypervisor go to 3.
5.1 Hypervisor Detection without
Flashing BIOS and Reinstalling OS
The proposed hypervisor detection method (or
its preliminary starting procedure) needs to
stop system activity to flash BIOS, reinstall
OS etc. But for some systems this interruption
of work is prohibited or impossible. However,
on the basic of our experimental results, we
can guarantee no hypervisor presence without
performing 1-2 steps and unwanted system
shutdown. To achieve this, we acquire IET
arrays on PC, which is already in operation. If
after IET arrays filtering step we get 1-2 stable
layers, this will mean that there is no
hypervisor. This peculiarity occurs on PCs
with Windows XP and should be investigated
further.
5.2 Applying Numerical Values of
Layers for Hypervisor Detection
We have discovered another pattern which can
be used to detect a hypervisor. Thus most of
our experiments numerical values of layers are
unique. For example, in Figure 7 we see that
numerical values of different layers after
filtering indicate hypervisor presence. We
achieve the following numerical values of layers
without hypervisor {2160, 2168, 2184, 2192,
2200, 2478, 2480, 2880, 2888, 2904, 2920, 2936}
and these values {2876, 2884, 2892, 2900, 2908,
2916, 2924} with PoC hypervisor. We see that
these two sets do not contain equal values.
Moreover, if a hypervisor cheats TSC so that
the first members from each set are equal, the
second and the next members from the above
sets will differ. This happens because of the
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differences of deltas in each set {8, 24, 32, 40,
318, 320, 720, 728, 744, 760, 776} and {8, 16,
24, 32, 40, 48}.
The reasons for this difference and its
resilience to hypervisor countermeasures
require further research.
5.3 Ways to Develop Computer
Forensics and Statistics for
Universities
The proposed statistical methods and tools for
hypervisor detection can be used in two
different disciplines. First, it may become a
part of Computer Forensics Discipline, when
students can acquire practical skills working
with hardware virtualization technology. PoC
hypervisor can be used as a basic platform for
further improvements; for example, to create
an event tracing tool which will monitor
low-level events and will be resilient to modern
malware. Hypervisor detection tools can be
used to invent new detection approaches,
based for example on all unconditionally
intercepted instructions (CPUID, INVD, MOV
from/to CR3, all VMX instructions, RDMSR
and WRMSR). These may have different
parameters, including wrong or invalid
parameters, as well as profiling execution time
for different sets and sequences of instructions,
not just ten CPUIDs as is described in this
paper. Analysis of time of physical memory
access can be applied to find time anomalies
due to possible hidden objects. Such a
detection approach may need checking all the
memory pages, including valid and invalid
addresses. We compare IET characteristics
before and after disabling the CPU’s cache
control mechanism. A stealth hypervisor has to
cheat TSC with different deltas for each case,
which does not always occur.
Second. it may become a part of a course
in “Statistics and Data Analysis”. Because of
its opportunity to acquire a lot of real
experimental data sets students can acquire
practical experience of data processing and its
analysis. They can learn how to solve
repeatability and reproducibility problems.
They can apply different statistical criteria to
test correlations between arrays for different
cases: with a hypervisor and without it. As a
result, students will not only better understand
the theoretical materials of the course, but will
also acquire new practical skills and apply
them in their own research.
5.4 Applying Hidden BIOS
Hypervisor to Track Stolen Laptops
It is well known that an organization has to
pay heavily every time an employee’s laptop is
lost or stolen. The idea is to create a software
agent which will track a laptop, block it if it is
stolen, control it remotely etc. This tool will
work like Computrace LoJack by Absolute
Software (2014). The key moment is to create
a software agent, which will be really hard to
detect, delete and block. By using hardware
virtualization technology, we can create a
hypervisor, which works permanently. To
guarantee that autorun works well, it will be
loaded from BIOS. This hypervisor can hide
memory areas and prevent its own rewriting
by software tools with the help of Shadow
Page Tables for AMD CPUs or Extended Page
Tables for Intel CPUs. This hypervisor can be
easily planted in any PC which supports
hardware virtualization. To facilitate
development of this hypervisor we can use
open source software components, for example
Coreboot (2014) for BIOS firmware, TianoCore
(2014) for UEFI and XEN (The Xen Project,
2014) as a basis for this hypervisor.
5.5 Applying Hypervisor as USB
Firewall to prevent BadUSB attack
Nohl and Lell (2014) presented an idea and
prototype of malware USB stick. The idea lies
in reprogramming a USB device in order to
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add new unauthorized functions. As a result,
for example, a reprogrammed USB stick will
work as a USB keyboard and by running
malware commands can take over a computer.
This vulnerability is really serious because this
USB device works invisibly for user and AVs
and formatting USB flash does not erase
malware firmware.
We can solve this challenge by using a
hypervisor’s facilities, which will control all the
devices access to the PC. By applying manual
configuration mode, the hypervisor can block
malware activities of such devices. It will look
as if a hypervisor is playing the role of a USB
firewall. For example, after a USB device plugs
into the computer port the hypervisor will
display the list of all registered devices and
allow the user to choose the appropriate
position. After that, the hypervisor will control
the work of all USB devices according to the
access policies of these devices. As a result, this
hypervisor working as USB firewall can
guarantee protection of PCs from BadUSB
attack or other malware USB devices.
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